assess the prospects for successful management of tensions through a sharedjurisdiction arrangement that satisfies both countries' territorial objectives�
The book is a densely packed, academic work� The opening chapter, in which Manicom lays his theoretical foundations and analytical framework, will demand particular effort from readers seeking immediate, practical insights� However, this academic investment is well worth the effort� The follow-up analysis is exceptionally insightful for not only academics but also policy makers, strategists, and military professionals� Its tone, however, reflects the fact that the author did most of his research in Japan (only five of the twenty-six interviews were conducted in Beijing), and Manicom seems intermittently challenged to shake a Japanese perspective� A more significant shortfall is that the book qualifies its strong case for optimism with two significant caveats� First, Manicom notes that past cooperation has only resulted when "material issues have been separated from the more symbolic aspects of [Sino-Japanese] relations" and that the countries have the greatest difficulty finding paths to cooperation over contested symbolic and strategic issues� Second, he qualifies his optimism also by stating that tensions will be sufficiently managed to prevent war only so long as "the leaders of each state can exercise the necessary leadership to manage their respective national pressures� " These caveats are of great concern, because leaders in both nations may find it increasingly difficult to manage the growing nationalistic demands of their constituents� Furthermore, because the years of cooperative efforts expertly documented in Manicom's case studies have taken the edge off many of the material issues, the remaining tension points are predominantly strategic and symbolic in nature� Still, despite these criticisms, the lessons contained in Manicom's insightful analysis will be of great value to those seeking to understand Sino-Japanese tensions and other maritime disputes� The Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad, in this well-written history of China over the past 250 years, tells the story from a broad global perspective� His approach tracks that of his earlier works on the Cold War, where he placed a binational rivalry into a larger world context� Similarly in this work, he sees the principal driver of China's modern experience as relentless internationalization� However, China is more than just a country� It is, as Lucien Pye once described it, "a civilization-state, pretending to be a nation-state� " Imperial in every respect, it pushed out, and the world has pushed back, powerfully, since 1750� However, the adjective "restless" in the title is an understatement� No country's modern history has been more tumultuous or more violent� Westad describes episodes, including the worst, that occurred in the time of "peace" that the Communist regime was supposed to usher in� The most deadly and destructive of modern China's encounters with the world, Westad astutely notes, was between 1937 and 1945-its war with Japan� In a campaign breathtaking in its brutality, Japan destroyed China's nascent republic, enabled the victory of the Communists in their civil war with the Nationalists, and destroyed the old imperial order in Asia� Thus, the new China was born into a world of many possibilities� Unhappily, none of the good ones, either domestically or internationally, was realized until 1979, when China's current "rise" can be said to have begun� Westad's fine account of what has come before brings us to realize that the rise of China will not necessarily have a calming effect on either the Chinese people or on others who live nearby� Since 1750, "internationalization, " though not entirely a one-way street, has been mostly that; now, the restless empire, once in a defensive crouch, is moving out smartly in all directions� Perhaps this should be expected of a "civilizational state, " except that today's China offers to the world nothing of what it once did-no high culture, no attainments in intellectual and philosophical life, and certainly no models for wise and effective governance� Instead, as Westad helps us see, the current regime is thrashing around, which makes its own future, as well as the futures both of its "near abroad" and of the world at large, hard to predict� Empires, we have been taught, are supposed to bring peace, but today's Middle Empire ruled from today's Beijing displays many indications that it is bent on becoming a major disturber of the peace� Yet even under a more enlightened outlook, there would be challenges: the Middle Empire borders on three nuclear-weapons states-Russia, India, and Pakistan-and probably also a fourth, North Korea� Even so, from his own well-informed examination of China's modern experience Westad concludes that prospects for peace remainnot a ringing vote of confidence in the powers that be in Beijing, but neither is it a wholly despairing outlook� After all, Westad is an accomplished historian of the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedomenhancing outcome of which reminds us that things do not always turn out badly� It has been said that "weapons speak to the wise-but in general they need interpreters� " The Military Lens, written by political scientist Christopher P� Twomey, associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, shows the difficulty of that quote� Twomey makes a strong case that differing military languages and doctrines explain otherwise puzzling examples of deterrence failure and escalation�
The Military Lens is a welcome addition to the literature on deterrence, which too often treats actors as interchangeable "black boxes� " Twomey writes in the spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis, explore psychological factors that led to misinterpreting the actions of others� Twomey's work adds the new factor of military doctrine� Every military has its own doctrine, or "theory of victory, " its vision of how military resources are to be used to achieve operational success� Twomey's core argument is that strategists look through a doctrinal "lens" when assessing capabilities 2 Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015] , No. 1, Art. 13 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/13
